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Alaska Wilderness League v. Jewell, 788 F.3d 1212 (9th Cir. 2015) 
 
Kevin Rechkoff  
   
The Ninth Circuit employed Chevron deference in their decision to 
confirm BSEE’s approval of Shell’s Oil Spill Response Plans. This holding 
represents a potential nail in the coffin for the parties seeking to block offshore 
drilling permits. Although the dissent refutes the majority’s interpretation of the 
ESA and NEPA consultation processes, this case stands as an example of how 
ambiguity in statutory language can have dire consequences on citizens seeking 
to enforce harsher environmental standards under an APA challenge. 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
At issue in Alaska Wilderness v. Jewell, was whether the Bureau of 
Safety and Environmental Enforcement (“BSEE” or “Agency”) had discretionary 
authority to consider supplementary factors in its Oil Spill Response Plans 
(“OSRP”) review process.1 In addition, the plaintiffs, comprised of numerous 
environmental advocacy groups, objected to the federal agency’s claims that they 
were not required to conduct Endangered Species Act (“ESA”) or National 
Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”) consultation in their ORSP approval 
process.2 The statute that governs the required contents of OSRPs contains two 
conflicting sections. 3  In one, six required components of the plans are 
enumerated.4 If these requirements are met, the BSEE is mandated to approve the 
plan regardless of the plan’s gaps in adherence to other environmental statutes.5 
Conversely, the parties seeking approval are also required to construct plans 
containing response measures that mitigate the environmental damage to the 
“maximum extent practicable.”6 In dealing with this conflict, the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that the BSEE acted within its 
regulatory authority when it decided the mandatory nature of the listed 
requirements was controlling in its approval process.7 The plaintiffs, in a losing 
effort, claimed the Agency’s approval violated provisions of the Clean Water Act 
(“CWA”) and the ESA by not conducting necessary NEPA consultation prior to 
federal agency action.8 However, the Ninth Circuit disagreed, stating the BSEE 
was not required to undertake ESA, CWA, or NEPA review because the Agency 
                                                 
1
  Alaska Wilderness League v. Jewell, 788 F.3d 1212, 1220 (9th Cir. 2015). 
2
  Id. at 1219. 
3
  Id. at 1220.  
4
  Id.; see Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1321(j)(5)(D) (2012).  
5
  Jewell, 788 F.3d at 1220; see 33 U.S.C. § 1321(j)(5)(E)(iii).  
6
  33 U.S.C. § 1321(j)(5)(D)(iii); see Jewell, 788 F.3d at 1215.  
7
  Jewell, 788 F.3d at 1223.  
8
  Id. at 1219. 
  
 
2 PUBLIC LAND & RESOURCES LAW REVIEW Vol. 0 
 
was mandated to approve an OSRP if the statutory requirements had been met.9 
Thus, because consultation would have no impact on BSEE’s discretion to 
approve or reject the OSRP, the court held it would be unreasonable to require 
the Agency to complete the NEPA or ESA process.10  
 
II.  FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
 
In a series of cases concerning off shore oil and gas development, the 
latest decision by the Ninth Circuit comes after a longstanding effort by Shell 
Gulf of Mexico, Inc., and Shell Offshore, Inc. (collectively “Shell”), to conduct 
offshore drilling operations in Alaskan waters. 11 In 2002, the Mineral 
Management Service (“MMS”) established a five-year leasing schedule for 
Alaska’s outer continental shelf.12 Between 2005 and 2008, Shell acquired leases 
to drill in the Beaufort and Chukchi Seas.13 Shell then submitted its OSRPs and 
exploration plans, with the goal of beginning extraction in 2010.14  In March 
2010, MMS approved both of Shell’s OSRPs.15  
Less than one month later, the Deepwater Horizon (“Deepwater”) 
catastrophe occurred.16 The explosion, rig sinking, and subsequent release of over 
4 million barrels of oil resulted in a moratorium on offshore drilling projects17 
and shifted the authority to approve OSRPs from the MMS to the BSEE.18 
Additionally, authority to approve exploration plans transferred from the MMS to 
the Bureau of Ocean Energy Management. 19  From a policy standpoint, the 
Department of the Interior (“DOI”) responded to the Deepwater catastrophe by 
issuing stricter guidance on the content required to be in the OSRPs.20 Shell 
submitted revised OSRPs in accordance with the new requirements in May 2011 
and the beginning of 2012.21 BSEE approved both OSRPs.22  
The plaintiffs then sued DOI and the Secretary of the Interior, the parties 
overseeing the BSEE, under the Administrative Procedures Act (“APA”), stating 
                                                 
9
  Id. at 1221.  
10
  Id. at 1226. 
11
  Id. at 1216. 
12
  Id.  
13
  Id.  
14
  Id. 
15
  Id.  
16
   David Barstow, David Rohode, Stephanie Saul, Deepwater Horizon’s Final                      
Hours, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 25, 2010), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/12/26/us/26 
spill.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0. 
17
  Hari M. Osofsky, Multidimensional Governance and the Bp Deepwater Horizon 
Oil Spill, 63 FLA. L. REV. 1077, 1079 (2011).   
18
  Jewell, 788 F.3d at 1217.  
19
  Id. at 1216.  
20
  Id. at 1217.  
21
  Id.  
22
  Id. 
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that BSEE had approved OSRPs that were inadequate in their response measures, 
violating the arbitrary and capricious standard of the APA.23 The United States 
District Court for the District of Alaska granted summary judgment in favor of 
the federal agency defendants and intervenor Shell, stating that the BSEE’s 
interpretations, and approval of the OSRPs was not unreasonable.24  
 
III.  ANALYSIS 
 
A.  OSRP Statutory Ambiguity 
 
On appeal, the plaintiffs again argued the BSEE had violated the APA by 
acting arbitrarily and capriciously when approving Shell’s OSRPs.25 In particular, 
the plaintiffs accused the BSEE of disregarding Shell’s oil spill recovery rate of 
ninety-percent, which they considered unreasonable and unsubstantiated.26 In its 
review, the Ninth Circuit disagreed that BSEE had relied on Shell’s claims when 
approving the OSRP, and held that the plaintiff’s incorrectly interpreted that 
language of the OSRP.27  
After dismissing the APA components of the plaintiffs argument, the 
court stated the approval of the OSRP would only be overturned if the BSEE 
relied on authority that Congress “did not intend” to impart upon it when 
designing the statute. 28  According to the court, the statute explaining the 
requirements of the OSRP was ambiguous both in its language and its 
construction.29 The court found the statute’s language ambiguous because it was 
silent on BSEE’s discretion to consider “additional environmental factors” in its 
review of an OSRP.30  
At conflict were two sections of the OSRP statute. 33 U.S.C. § 
1321(j)(5)(A)(i) states that owners and operators of drilling platforms are 
required to respond to a worst-case scenario spill to the “maximum extent 
practicable.”31  Under this language, BSEE has discretion to determine if the 
OSRP has provided enough evidence that the owner or operator will be able to 
respond fully to a worst-case scenario.32 The other subpart of the statute, 33 
U.S.C. § 1321(j)(5)(D), provides a list of requirements for OSRPs, and states 
                                                 
23
  Id. at 1217; see Administrative Procedures Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2012). 
24
  Jewell, 788 F.3d.at 1217.  
25
  Id. at 1218. 
26
  Id. 
27
  Id. at 1219. 
               
28
  Id. at 1217 (quoting Lands Council v. McNair, 537 F.3d 981, 987 (9th Cir.    
2008)).  
29
  Id. at 1220.  
30
  Id.  
31
  Id. at 1220 (quoting 33 U.S.C. § 1321(j)(5)(A)(i)).  
32
  Id. at 1220.  
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unequivocally that, if met, the agency must approve the OSRP.33 In response to 
this contradiction, the BSEE determined that the enumerated requirements and its 
mandate to approve, if satisfied, removed all agency discretion to review if the 
OSRP met the “maximum extent practicable” threshold.34  
In its review, the court held it was appropriate to grant an agency’s 
statutory interpretation Chevron deference when conflicting language created 
ambiguity. 35  Additionally, the court stated when statutory language presents 
uncertainty as to the appropriate construction of a statute, agency interpretation 
should prevail “unless it is unreasonable.” 36  The BSEE argued that the 
“maximum extent practicable” section was merely an instruction to issue 
regulations that delineate how operators can comply with statutory checklist 
requirements. 37  Therefore, the BSEE read the statutory language of § 
1321(j)(5)(D) as a restriction on its discretionary authority.38 The court held this 
interpretation was reasonable in light of the Agency’s review of Shell’s OSRP, 
and thus the plaintiffs’ challenge failed to demonstrate evidence that the BSEE’s 
interpretation exceeded or fell short of its statutory obligations.39 
 
B.  Impact of Ambiguity and Interpretation on Consultation 
 
The plaintiffs further argued that BSEE was required to engage in ESA 
consultation prior to approving the OSRPs, and that failure to complete an 
Environmental Impact Statement (“EIS”) was a violation of NEPA.40 Thus, the 
plaintiffs argued that the EIS was required to ensure minimal impact on species 
affected by a worst-case discharge.41 However, the court disagreed, holding that 
the statutory requirements of the ESA could not defeat an agency’s non-
discretionary authority to implement a statute they have been charged with 
administering.42 In other words, the court found that an agency directly in charge 
of administering a statute couldn’t expand its implementation authority due to the 
language of an alternative statute.43 Therefore, the court held that the process of 
determining if the requirements of § 1321(j)(5)(D) have been met does not 
trigger consultation under the ESA.44 Furthermore, because BSEE must approve 
                                                 
33
  Id.  
34
  Id. at 1220.  
35
  Id.  
36
  Id.; see Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Resources Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S.     
837 (1984). 
37
  Jewell, 788 F.3d at 1221.  
38
  Id.   
39
  Id. at 1223.  
40
  Id. at 1225.  
41
  Id.  
42
  Id.  
43
  Id.  
44
  Id.   
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the OSRP if all requirements have been met, the court held completing an EIS 
under NEPA was not required because it would serve no purpose due to the 
mandatory nature of the language in § 1321(j)(5)(D).45 
 
C.  Dissenting Opinion 
 
  In contrast, the dissent contended the BSEE was required to conduct 
ESA and NEPA consultation, stating that because the Agency had the ability to 
take measures to protect endangered species, it was required to undergo the ESA 
consultation process before approving an OSRP.46 The dissent agreed with the 
majority that the BSEE was required to follow the mandatory nature of the OSRP 
statutory language and approve the plan if the six requirements listed were met.47 
However, the dissent stated that the BSEE did not have the authority to ignore 
the mandates of coexisting environmental statutes if the OSRP could be revised 
or improved to mitigate the impact on environmentally sensitive populations or 
ecosystems.48  This interpretation of NEPA, the ESA, and the CWA was not 
persuasive to the majority.  
 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
 
The court’s holding in Alaska Wilderness League v. Jewell demonstrates 
the power of Chevron deference. By affirming the BSEE’s interpretation as 
reasonable, the court has promulgated a narrow rule and granted a federal agency 
the authority to disregard the requirements of parallel environmental statutes in 
favor of the statute they are in charge of overseeing. In essence, the court made it 
clear that a federal agency’s interpretation of an ambiguous statute, unless it is 
unreasonable, holds ultimate authority on the issue. The majority’s statement that 
consultation requirements set forth by the ESA and NEPA are in some cases 
unnecessary has the potential to be an argument raised and debated in similar 
cases. The necessity of the ESA and NEPA consultation process will be an 
interesting legal battleground in the future, as parties seeking to drill for oil in 
America’s offshore reserves will likely use this decision to avoid certain 
requirements of those statutes.  
 
 
                                                 
45
  Id. at 1226. 
46
  Id. at 1227 (Nelson, J., dissenting). 
47
  Id. 
48
  Id.  
